RESUMENEl autor resume la situación del os estudios relativos a la unidad de la Metafísica aristotélica, desde Jaeger a Düring; expone los motivos por los que le parece superada la fragmentación del pensamiento del filósofo griego defendida durante decenios, y propone una solución especulativa al problema, con base en la consideración de la metafísica como una realidad viva y dinámica.PALABRAS CLAVEARISTÓTELES-METAFÍSICAABSTRACTThe author offers a summary of the studies on the unity of Aristotle's Methaphysics from Jaegger to Düring; he defends the (...) thesis that the treaty is not completely fragmented, but offers a certain degree of cohesion. Finally, he proposes a theoretical solution for the question bases on the consideration of metaphysics as something alive and dynamic.KEYWORDSARISTOTLE-METHAPHYSICS. (shrink)

El análisis fenomenológico caracteriza a la dignidad humana mediante tres notas: elevación, intimidad y autonomía. La filosofía la describe como la su-perior bondad de lo absoluto. Y la ontología hace residir esa nobleza en la peculiar subsistencia del sujeto humano, que recibe en el alma espiritual, in-mortal y necesaria, el propio actus essendi.

Controversy over providing financial incentives to research participants has a long history and remains an issue of contention in both current discussions about research ethics and for institutional review bodies/human research ethics committees which are charged with the responsibility of deciding whether such incentives fall within ethical guidelines. The arguments both for and against financial incentives have been well aired in the literature. A point of agreement for many is that inducement in the form of financial incentive is permissible when (...) the risk of harm to the individual is negligible in terms of degree and probability of occurrence. In the absence of harm to the individual, encouraging more people to participate in research would appear to be a good thing in so far as it will lead to statistically more robust research outcomes, which can then be translated into better healthcare and other practice. Whilst, on the face of it, this position seems highly defensible, I will explore the possibility that it is counterproductive – that is, providing individuals with financial incentives to become research participants may have the unintended outcome of reducing participation rates in some areas of research. In exploring this idea I will draw on empirical findings from the literature on crowding-out – the hypothesis that providing monetary incentives to people can backfire by overall reducing intrinsic motivation, in this instance intrinsic motivation to behave altruistically or undertake civic duties. (shrink)

Nondualism, ontology, and anthropology -- Anthropology and the synthetic a priori: Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty -- Blind faith and the binding of Isaac: the Akedah -- Excursus I: sacrifice as human existence -- Counter-sacrifice and instrumental reason: the Holocaust -- Bourdieu's anti-dualism and "generalized materialism" -- Habermas's anti-dualism and "communicative rationality" -- Technological efficacy, mythic rationality, and non-contradiction -- Epistemic efficacy, mythic rationality, and non-contradiction -- Contradiction and choice among the Dinka and in Genesis -- Contradiction in Azande oracular practice and (...) in psychotherapeutic interaction -- Epistemic and ethical gain -- Transcending dualism and amplifying choice -- Excursus II: what good, ethics? -- Anthropology and the generative primacy of moral order -- Conclusion: Emancipatory selfhood and value-rationality. (shrink)

Criticises the reduction of rightness and wrongness to the emotional reaction of an impartial observer to actions.

Study of Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa, work on the fundamentals of Sankhya philosophy.

IT HAS OFTEN BEEN SUPPOSED that Aristotle's account of thought and action imposes severe limits on the functions and scope of practical reason; and insofar as Thomas Aquinas accepts Aristotle's account, he seems to be forced into the same restrictive view of practical reason. Practical reason expresses itself primarily in deliberation ; and the virtue that uses practical reason correctly is the deliberative virtue of prudence. Aristotle believes that deliberation is confined to means to ends, while will is focused on (...) ends. Some ends that are assumed on some occasions may on other occasions also count as means to more ultimate ends; but it seems that the most ultimate ends must be taken for granted in any deliberation. Since every deliberation must take for granted some end to which the deliberation finds means, the conclusions of rational deliberation must ultimately be about means to ultimate ends that are not themselves subject to practical reason. (shrink)